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Abstract.
In this chapter, we study some research issues from IoT-based crowdsourcing in
strategic setting. We have considered the scenario in the IoT-based crowdsourcing,
where there are multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices as task executors.
Each task requester has multiple tasks, with the tasks having start and finish times.
Based on the start and finish times, the tasks are to be distributed into different
slots. On the other hand, in each slot, each IoT device requests for the set of tasks
that it wants to execute along with the valuation that it will charge in exchange of
its service. Both the requested set of tasks and the valuations are private informa-
tions. Given such scenario, the objective is to allocate the subset of IoT devices to
the tasks in a non-conflicting manner with the objective of maximizing the social
welfare. For the purpose of determining the unknown quality of the IoT devices we
have utilized the concept of peer grading. Therefore, we have designed a truthful
mechanism for the problem under investigation that also allows us to have the true
information about the quality of the IoT devices.
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1. Introduction
Crowdsourcing is the process of completion of task(s) by a group of common people
or crowd workers in the form of an open call. The definition of crowdsourcing was first
brought into lime light by Jeff Howe1 and Mark Robinson in the year 2005. Indeed, the
use of crowdsourcing can be traced back to the 18th century when the British govern-
1Howe, Jeff (June 2, 2006). ”Crowdsourcing: A Definition”. Crowdsourcing Blog (Accessed December 15,
2019). https://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006/06/crowdsourcing a.html
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ment was trying to measure the ship’s longitudinal position. For this purpose, the idea of
crowdsourcing is utilized by projecting the problem of measuring the ship’s longitudinal
position to the outside world [1]. The solution to this problem was provided by a large
number of people around the globe and the person or group of people with best solution
was selected and given some incentives (incentives may be in terms of money or some
social recognition). As another example, in the year 1884 by utilizing the idea of crowd-
sourcing the Oxford English Dictionary was developed from the scratch by a group of
800 volunteers from around the world who contributed the words.
The sourcing model of crowdsourcing has shown to be useful in the Internet-based
systems, whereby a group of people or devices collaborate together online to achieve
a cumulative result for a problem of interest. One of most notable examples is that of
Wikipedia− a free-access and the source of free contents−Internet encyclopedia, devel-
oped by crowd of common people by acting as the contributors for their own interest.
In past decades, there have emerged several scenarios where the crowdsourcing has
been shown to be useful, e.g.:
• Measuring the air pollution level in the environment of the several geographical
region around the globe [42,34,29,15].
• A group of office Workers can provide the information about the traffic condition
of the road, where they live or through which they travel [20].
• A fit sports person can provide his/her daily groove with the help of multiple
sensors embedded in his/her cell phone and few wearable sensors, hoping to make
changes in the lifestyle of large community [12,26].
• Deploying the rescuers at the spot where the natural or man-made disaster has
taken place after the information is outsourced by the volunteers [31,35].
• Other examples include software engineering [27], data collection [32], finance
and business [21], massive computations by volunteer computing such as projects
SETI@home2, etc.
As stated earlier, crowdsourcing is an open call to the community for accomplishing
one or more tasks (the reader is referred to [16,40,7,28] for a detailed overview of the
crowdsourcing). An interesting research question in this context is what incentive policy
(may be in terms of money or some social recognition) is to be followed so that large
number of common people is interested towards such type of system? On going through
the research carried out in the direction of crowdsourcing, we have found that one of
the potential solutions is to provide the enough incentives to the crowdworkers in ex-
change of their services. Several allocation-payment policies are proposed that provide
incentives to the participating agents [24,13,11,23]. Once the solution to the above raised
question is determined, it posed several other open questions, such as:
1. who are the crowd workers that will be hired for performing the floated task(s)?
2. how to determine the quality the crowd workers?
3. what payment policy should be followed, so that, the crowd workers continues to
be motivated in the future for crowdsourcing systems?
In order to answer questions raised above, several works have been done in the past
to address them [44,8,23,13].
2https://setiathome.berkeley.edu/
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With regard to payment schemes, in [25] the winning agents are paid some fixed
value (the crowdsourcing platform sets this value apriori) in exchange of their services
as incentives. The issue that may arise in such payment scheme is that the participating
agents may be getting low payment in exchange of their services. As an implication, the
agents may not be interested to join the event of task execution under the umbrella of
crowdsourcing. As the participating agents are rational, they may manipulate their bid
values to get some extra incentives from crowdsourcing market. Some incentive compat-
ible mechanisms for the crowdsourcing environment is proposed in [45,9,45,10].
More recently, crowdsourcing is gaining increasing interest by the researchers and
developers in the IoT field aiming to find solutions to IoT challenges. In [41] the em-
phasis is mainly on the several open research directions in the IoT. Along with this, the
discussions have been carried out in the direction of solving several IoT challenges by
combining the power of crowdsourcing and the IoT. Some quality adaptive schemes are
discussed in various recent works [17,11,14,19].
With respect to the timeline of the task completion, in [43] the set-up consists of
multiple tasks and multiple workers. The tasks are having deadlines and also workers
arrive to and depart from the crowd on a regular basis. Now, based on the workers in-
terest (or ability), each of the workers indicate the set of tasks interested in to the plat-
form. Based on the interest received by the platform, tasks are assigned to the work-
ers before their deadlines. Given this set-up, the objective is to design the mechanism
in such a way that it maximizes the total expected gain subject to deadline and budget
constraints. In [13] the set-up with single task requester and multiple task executors is
investigated and that can be further extended to the set-up with multiple task executors
and multiple task requesters, where the task executors are the IoT devices. This extended
set-up is investigated in [39], where some quality adaptive budget feasible mechanisms
are proposed.
1.1. Problem Statement
In this chapter, we have considered the scenario in the IoT-based crowdsourcing, where
there are multiple task requesters and multiple IoT devices as task executors. Each task
requester has multiple tasks, with the tasks having start and finish times. Based on the
start and finish times, the tasks are to be distributed into different time slots.
Platform
Crowd WorkersTask Requesters
Submit
Tasks
Tasks
Projected
Tasks ExecutedCompleted Tasks
Figure 1. A Pictorial Representation of Proposed Model
On the other hand, in each time slot, each IoT device requests for the set of tasks that
it wants to execute along with the valuation that it will charge in exchange of its service.
The general framework of the crowdsourcing is shown in Fig. 1. In this framework, first,
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the task requester(s) submits the task(s) to the platform. Once the platform receives the
task(s), based on the nature of the task(s), the task(s) or subtasks are crowdsourced to the
group of crowd workers (also termed as task executors). The task executors process the
task(s) and return back the completed task(s) to the platform. The platform then provides
the completed task(s) to the task requester(s). In this chapter, the task executor(s), or
task requester(s), or both as a combination, will also be termed as participating agents
depending on the context arises.
1.2. Chapter’s Contribution
Our contribution in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• The tasks assignment problem in the IoT-based crowdsourcing is modelled by
utilizing the concept of mechanism design with money.
• A truthful mechanism, namely Combinatorial Auction Based mechanism for Task
Assignment Problem (CAB-TAP) for selecting the subset of IoT devices in a
non-conflicting manner with the objective of maximizing the social welfare, is
proposed and analyzed.
1.3. Chapter’s Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we overview the works
carried out in the recent past in the direction of IoT-based crowdsourcing. The exten-
sion of the model for the task assignment problem is presented in Section 3 and the pro-
posed combinatorial auction based mechanism in Section 4. The analysis of the proposed
mechanisms is briefly outlined in Section 5. We end the chapter in Section 6 with some
concluding remarks.
2. Overview of Prior Work on the IoT Allocation Problem
In this section, we discuss the work carried out in the recent past on the IoT allocation
problem. First, the detailed problem scenario is presented in [39] are discussed in Sub-
secs. 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. Further, in Subsect. 2.3 a summative evaluation of the
theoretical results obtained for the problem are discussed.
2.1. Problem Scenario
In [39] an IoT based crowdsourcing is presented where the problem scenario is as fol-
lows: there are multiple task requesters and multiple task executors (or IoT devices).
Each task requester is having a single task and also an associated budget (the maximum
amount he can pay) with the task. The task requesters submit the tasks along with the
associated budget with each of the tasks to the task management platform. The platform
projects the submitted tasks to the outside world where the task executors are present.
On seeing the tasks, each task executor reports the interested set of tasks along with the
value (private information) he will charge for executing each task.
It is to be noted that, in this proposed model, the participating agents (task execu-
tors and task requesters) are strategic in nature. By strategic, we mean that the agents
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can manipulate their privately held information(s) in order to gain. Upon receiving the
information about the interested set of the task executors along with their value for ex-
ecuting the tasks, the platform allocates the tasks to the task executors. In this set-up, it
is assumed that each task executor will execute all of its interested tasks and also each
of the task executors will execute a single task at a time. In order to preserve the above
mentioned assumption, each of the tasks for which a task executor has shown interest is
placed into different time slot (e.g. slots may be morning, afternoon, evening). Once the
tasks are distributed into different time slots, the task executors execute the task(s) and
submit the completed tasks back to the platform.
Further, the non-trivial goal here is to determine the set of quality task executors.
In [39], for determining the quality of the task executors the idea of peer grading [3,37]
is utilized. For each time slot, and for each task, the process of peer grading is carried
out to select the quality task executors. Once we have a set of quality task executors for
each task, there has to be selected a subset of task executors in such a way that the total
payment made to the winning task executors is within total available budget.
For the above discussed set-up, the truthful budget feasible mechanism is proposed
that takes into account the quality of the IoT devices.
2.2. Proposed Mechanisms
In this section, we discuss the mechanisms proposed for the above discussed problem
scenario. For the rudimentary version of the problem the proposed mechanism namely
(TUBE-TAP) Truthful bUdget feasiBle mEchanism for the Task Allocation Problem
consists of the following three components:
1. Time slot allocation
2. Quality determination, and
3. Allocation and payment.
In the following subsections we present each of the components of the TUBE-TAP.
2.2.1. Time slot allocation
In order to distribute the tasks into different time slots, in the works [5,2], there have
been designed the Time slot allocation motivated from the idea of register allocation. The
central idea of the mechanism is:
• Let g be the available number of time slots, which is given apriori.
• If any arbitrary task has less than g adjacent tasks in the graph then:
– Pick that task.
– Put the task under consideration on the stack and remove it from the
graph along with its incident edges.
• Otherwise, move the task on the next day for getting executed.
• Pop the task present at the top of the stack and assign the lowest number of
time slot that is not assigned to its neighbour.
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2.2.2. Quality determination
In order to determine the quality of IoT devices from the available set of IoT devices,
there has been proposed a mechanism motivated by Majority voting rule [33,38].
The outline of the mechanism is the following:
• For each task, randomly pick q IoT devices.
• Assign the q IoT devices to p other IoT devices (as peers) for the ranking
purpose, such that p≥ q.
• Select an IoT device that appears first in the most of the rankings of IoT
devices.
2.2.3. Allocation and payment
In order to determine who wins? and what will be the payment?, there has been proposed
this Allocation and payment rule. For each task:
• Sort the IoT devices in ascending order of their bid values.
• Each time pick an IoT device from the sorted ordering and a check is made
whether the bid value of the IoT device under consideration is less than or
equal to the ratio of the budget associated with the task to the index of the
IoT device under consideration.
• If the stopping condition stated in step 2 is satisfied then the IoT device
under consideration is placed in the winning set.
• Step 2 and Step 3 is continued until the stopping condition is satisfied.
• The payment of the winning IoT device is the minimum of the budget as-
sociated with the task and the bid value of the first loser from the sorted
ordering.
2.3. Summative Evaluation of the Results
In this section, we discuss the results obtained in [39]. First, it is shown that TUBE-TAP
mechanism is truthful. It means that the participating IoT devices will not gain by mis-
reporting their private information (in this case the bid value). Further, there has been
shown that the allocation done by TUBE-TAP is at most 2 allocation away from the op-
timal allocation (in a near-optimal approximate sense). Next, the estimate is determined
such that the number of tasks for which any arbitrary IoT device will be considered. One
of the results of [39] is regarding the expected length of contiguous rejection that any
IoT device can face. It is found that is O(logω ki), where ki is the number of tasks for i
th
task executor has shown interest and ω is the probability with which Ei is considered for
a task.
Proposition 2.1. TUBE-TAP is truthful [39].
Proposition 2.2. The allocation resulted by TUBE-TAP is at most 2 allocation away
from the optimal one i.e. OPT ≤ 2×OM; where OPT is the optimal allocation and OM
is the allocation resulted by TUBE-TAP [39].
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Proposition 2.3. The expected number of times any arbitrary Ei is considered (or win-
ning) is given as p · ki; where ki is the number of tasks for which the ith IoT device has
shown interest and p is the probability with which Ei is considered for a task. In other
words, E[X i] = p ·ki; where X i is the random variable measuring the number of times Ei
is considered out of ki [39].
Proposition 2.4. For any arbitrary IoT device Ei, the expected length of longest con-
tiguous rejection, starting from any of its ith task in consideration, is given as O(logω ki),
where ki is the number of tasks for which Ei has shown interest. More formally, we can
say E[Y ] = O(logω ki), where Y is a random variable that captures the length of longest
continuous rejection of any IoT device [39].
3. Extension of the IoT Allocation Model
In this section, we present the formal statement of our problem studied in this chapter,
which extends the former IoT allocation model.
• We have m number of task requesters and n number of task executors, such that
m < n.
• The set of task requesters is represented as R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rm} and the set of
task executors is given as E= {E1, E2, . . . , En}.
• The set of tasks endowed by all the task requesters is given as t = {t1, t2, . . . , tk},
where k ≥ m. Each task requester Ri is having mi tasks to be executed, such that
∑
∀Ri∈R
mi = k. Each task ti has a start time si and a finish time fi, such that fi ≥ si3.
However, the two tasks ti and t j may overlap. By overlapping, it is meant that
si ≤ s j ≤ f j ≤ fi or si ≤ s j ≤ fi ≤ f j or s j ≤ si ≤ f j ≤ fi or s j ≤ si ≤ fi ≤ f j.
We assume that the set of tasks is submitted to the task management platform along
with the information of their start time and finish time. Once the platform receives the
set of tasks along with the information about their start time and finish time, then the first
non-trivial goal is to distribute the tasks into minimum number of different time slots
such that the tasks are not overlapping4. Here, it is assumed that, in each slot, we have
a substantial number of task executors available for executing the allocated tasks. In our
set-up, the set of slots is given as τ = {1,2, . . . ,g}.
Let us understand the way the tasks are being allocated into different time slots with
the help of an example. Say, we have 10 tasks and each of the tasks is having start time
and finish time as depicted in Fig. 5. The tasks in this example can all be placed in a non-
conflicting manner using three slots, as shown in Fig. 2a, where the tasks are rearranged
into three rows, each containing a set of non-conflicting tasks.
3Depending on the applications, the difference between the start time and finish time of the tasks may be in
hours or days or years.
4It is to be noted that the minimum number of slots that are required to place the tasks in a non-conflicting
manner is not known a priori and needs to be determined. For this purpose we have designed an algorithm
namely Slot allocation motivated by Interval partitioning algorithm [18,30].
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(b) Allocation of Slots to the Tasks
Figure 2. Example of distribution of tasks to different slots
In general, one can think of a solution using t different slots as a rearrangement of
the tasks into t rows, each containing non-conflicting tasks. In our approach, in order to
distribute the tasks into different slots such that in each slot the tasks are present in a non-
conflict manner, a mechanism is proposed namely Slot distribution mechanism motivated
by [18,30].
Once the tasks are distributed into say ` ≤ g different slots, the next objective is to
determine the quality task executors among the available ones, in a slot. For this purpose,
the idea of peer grading is utilized. In this, a very small part of the tasks may be given to
the task executors for execution. Now, once executed, the completed tasks by the tasks
executors will be distributed among the peers for the ranking purpose. It means that, each
task executorEi (one of the peers) will provide a ranking over the subset of task executors
in that particular slot. By ranking it is meant that each task executor reports a distinct
number between 1 to u (where u is the number of task executors selected to be ranked)
against the available task executors. Let us say the values reported by the task executor
Ei for the task performed by the task executors E j and Ek be w and z respectively, such
that w < z. If this is the case, then the task executor Ei prefers E j over Ek. Considering
the ranking of the task executors, for each slot, the peer grading process results in the
quality task executors. Once the quality task executors are determined, the next objective
is to determine who gets what? and what will be their payment? For this purpose, one
of the important attributes associated with the task executors is preserved i.e. the type of
the task executors.
In our case, considering any time slot l, the type of each task requester consists of
two components:
1. The requested set of tasks for execution termed as request
2. The cost he is willing to pay to the task executors in exchange of the services
received from them termed as valuation.
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In this model, it is considered that the participating agents are strategic. By strategic,
we mean that the agents can report their type in a non truthful manner. Considering the
first component, the request vector of the task executors is given as r = {r1,r2, . . . ,rml},
where r j is the true request set over the tasks by jth task executor. It is better to represent
the the requested set of tasks by any jth task executor as rˆ j. r j = rˆ j ensures the fact that
the request set reported by jth task executor is true. Along with the request set, each task
executor reveals the valuation that he will charge in exchange of his services.
The valuation of any jth task executor is represented as υ j. If the jth task executor
gets his specified set of tasks or the superset then υ j ∈ℜ+ otherwise 0. It is convenient to
represent the reported value for his services termed as bid value as b j. b j = υ j represents
the fact that the jth task executor is reporting his true bid value. The type of any jth task
executor is given as β j = 〈r j,υ j〉. As discussed above, the type of any task executor is the
combination of request set and the valuation that are private informations, so as the type.
So, we can say that the type of any task executor can be mis-reported. By mis-reporting
the type of any jth task executor, it is meant that, the jth task executor is either mis-
reporting the request or the valuation or both. Now, βˆ j = β j means that the type reported
by jth task executor is true. For any slot l, given the above discussed scenario, there is
a possibility of conflict in the type of the task executors. By conflict of kth task executor
and jth task executor, we mean that at least one task is in common in the request sets of
these two task executors. More formally, the two types β k = 〈rk,υk〉 and β j = 〈r j,υ j〉
conflicts if and only if rk∩ r j 6= φ . Given the above discussed set-up, in a particular slot,
our proposed mechanism determines the wining task executors and decide the payment
made to the task executors. For lth slot, the winning set is given as wl ⊆ [n] such that
for every i 6= j ∈ wl , ri ∩ r j = φ with maximum social welfare (see Definition 4). The
payment of any ith winning task executor is given as pi otherwise 0. So, for any i
th task
executor the utility is given as:
ui =
{
pi−υi(r˜i), if r˜i ⊇ ri
0,Otherwise
(1)
where, r˜i is the set of tasks allocated to the ith task executor and pi is the payment received
by the task executor for executing the set of tasks r˜i.
Definition 1 (Incentive compatible or Truthful). A mechanism is truthful, if for any ar-
bitrary task executor i reporting the type as βˆ i = 〈rˆi, υˆ i〉 instead of β i = 〈ri,υ i〉 gives the
utility uˆi ≤ ui.
Definition 2 (Single-minded bidders). A valuation υ i is single-minded if and only if
there exist a set x ⊂ T of tasks and a bid value as υ i ∈ ℜ+ such that υ i(y) = υ i for all
y⊇ x, and υ i(y) = 0 for all other y.
Definition 3 (Monotonicity). Fix the type of other task executors, the ith task executor
who wins with the type β i = 〈ri,υ i〉 keeps on winning for any valuation υ˜ i > υ i and for
any r˜i ⊂ ri.
Definition 4 (Social Welfare). It is defined as: for any selected set of winners the sum of
the valuations of all the task executors in the winning set.
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4. The Proposed Mechanism: CAB-TAP
In this section, we outline the proposed truthful mechanism namely Combinatorial Auc-
tion Based Mechanism for Task Assignment Problem (CAB-TAP) for the problem under
consideration. The main components of the CAB-TAP are: Slot Allocation, Quality Task
Executors Selection and Allocation and Pricing rule. We describe them next.
4.1. Slot Allocation
The aim of the Slot Allocation is to distribute the tasks into different time slots such that
in a each slot we have a set of non-overlapping tasks. The idea of the Slot Allocation
is that, first, the tasks are sorted in the ascending order of their start time. Once sorted,
next, each time a task is picked up from the sorted ordering and is assigned to some
available compatible slot. If the task is not compatible with the available slots, then the
new slot is allocated and the task is scheduled. The process terminates once all the tasks
are allocated the slots.
Slot Allocation
• Sort the tasks in ascending order of their start time. Break the ties randomly.
• Initially, the number of allocated slots is 0.
• Repeat:
- If task T j is compatible with some slot, then schedule task T j in any such
slot.
- Else Allocate a new slot and schedule task T j in that new slot.
• Until: Each task is processed.
Illustrative Example To illustrate the above discussed algorithm, let us consider an ex-
ample with 3 task requesters and 5 task executors. Say, we have 10 tasks and each of the
tasks is having start time and finish time as depicted in Fig. 3.
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(b) Allocation of Slots to the Tasks
Figure 3. Example of distribution of tasks to different slots
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Let us say, the task requester R1 have the tasks t1, t3, t5, and t7. The task requesters
R2 and R3 have the tasks t2, t4, t10 and t6, t8, t9 respectively. Now applying the Slot
Allocation to the initial configuration shown in Fig. 3a. First of all, the tasks are sorted in
ascending order of their start time and we get t1≤ t3≤ t2≤ t4≤ t5≤ t6≤ t8≤ t7≤ t9≤ t10.
From the sorted ordering, pick task t1 and allocate slot 1 as task t1 is compatible with slot
1. Next, task t2 is picked up and will be placed in the slot 2 as task t2 is not compatible
in slot 1 due to presence of task t1. Further, task t3 is picked up and will be placed in
the slot 3 as task t3 is not compatible in slot 1 and 2 due to presence of tasks t1 and t2
respectively. In the similar fashion, the remaining tasks will be scheduled in different
slots and we will get the configuration depicted in Fig. 3b.
4.2. Quality Task Executors Selection
In this section, a mechanism is proposed for determining the quality task executors
among the available task executors. The Quality task executors selection is based on
Ranked choice voting [38]. First, the outline of the Quality Task Executors Selection is
presented. After that the detailed version of the mechanism is discussed.
4.2.1. Outline of Quality Task Executors Selection
Here, we have provided the underlying idea of the Quality Task Executors Selection. In
this, in each slot, the small part of tasks are distributed among the available task executors
for execution purpose. Once, the tasks are done, the completed tasks of randomly picked
u task executors is given to some v other task executors for the ranking purpose, such
that v > u. If any task executor is appearing at first place in more than 50% of the rank
list then he will be the winner. Else, the task executor that is appearing at first place in
least number of rank list will be removed from the market and the winner determination
will be carried out among the remaining task executors. The process iterate until all the
task executors are ranked. This mechanism results in quality task executors.
Quality Task Executors Selection
In each slot k:
Repeat:
1. Randomly pick u task executors and allocate it to the v other randomly se-
lected task executors out of (nτ −u) task executors for the ranking process.
Here, the relation between u and v is v > u.
2. Now, u task executors submit the full ranked list over the v task executors.
3. If any of the task executors receive the first position in more than half of the
task executors participating in the ranking process, then he will be selected
as the winner. Otherwise, the task executor that is appearing at first place
in the least number of rank lists will be removed from the market and the
winner will be determined from the rest of the task executors.
4. At the end, it may be the case that, we may be left with only two task execu-
tors, in such situation the rule is: select the task executor that appears first
in the ranking of most of the task executors among v task executors (if the
tie occur, then break the tie randomly and select the winner).
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Until: Each task executor is ranked.
Algorithms of the Quality Task Executors Selection This section presents the detailing
of the Quality Task Executors Selection. Prior to this mechanism, the Main routine is
presented in Alg. 1. The idea behind providing the Main routine is to determine the
quality task executors for each slot. In Main routine, line 1−6 keeps track of each slot.
Line 7 returns the allocation and payment vectors for all the slots in the system. In Alg. 2,
line 1 initializes the variables.
Algorithm 1 Main routine
Input: T, E, τ
Output: a, p
1: for i ∈ τ do
2: (ηi, υ˜ i)← Quality Task Executors Selection (Ti, Ei) [Algorithm 2]
3: (a′j, p′j)← Allocation and Pricing Rule (ηi, υ˜ i) [Algorithm 3]
4: a← a∪a′j
5: p← p∪ p′j
6: end for
7: return a, p
Algorithm 2 Quality Task Executors Selection
Input: Ti, Ei, υ
Output: ηi← φ , υ˜i← φ
1: f ← φ , ξ ← φ
2: ei = Ei
3: while ei 6= φ do
4: e′i = Ei
5: f ← Pick random (ei, u) . Pick u number of task executors from ei set.
6: f¯ = f
7: ξ ← Pick random (e′i \ f , v) . Pick v number of task executors from e′i \ f set.
8: Assign the completed task of each task executor present in f to the task executors
in ξ for the ranking purpose.
9: while | f |> 1 do
10: if any Ei ∈ f is ranked top by more than 50% of the task executors in ξ then
11: ηi ← ηi ∪ {Ei}
12: υ˜i← υ˜i∪{υi}
13: break
14: else
15: Remove Ei from f that is ranked at the first place by least number of IoT
devices in ξ .
16: end if
17: end while
18: ei← ei \ f¯
19: end while
20: return ηi, υ˜i
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In line 2, ei keeps the copy of the task executors present in ith slot. The while loop in
line 3-18 iterates until all the task executors in a particular slot are ranked up. In line
4, e′i keeps the copy of the task executors present in ith slot. u number of task executors
are randomly picked up from the set ei in line 5 that are to be ranked. In line 6, f¯ keeps
the copy of the task executors that are selected to be ranked. The v task executors are
randomly selected from the set e′i \ f for the ranking purpose. Line 8 assigns the task
of each task executors present in the set f to the task executors present in the set ξ for
ranking. Using line 9−16, in each iteration of while loop, the task executor that appear
at first place in more than 50% of the task executors rank list that task executor will be
considered as the winner. If not, then the task executor that is appearing at the top in the
least number of rankings, will be deleted. The while loop terminates once the number of
task executors remaining for the ranking purpose is less than 2. Finally, line 19 returns ηi
and υ˜i that contains the quality IoT devices for task T j and their bid values respectively.
Illustrative Example For the detailed illustration of Alg. 2 we have considered the set-
up discussed in example above. In this example, we have illustrated Alg. 2 for one time
slot, say slot 1. However, similar procedure could be followed for the remaining slots.
In slot 1, say we have 12 task executors and is given as: E1, E5, E7, E8, E9, E11, E13,
E14, E16, E19, E20, and E22. For the 1st iteration of quality determination mechanism, we
have randomly selected 4 task executors (u = 4) say E5, E11, E16, and E20 and assigned
their executed task to the randomly selected 5 task executors for the reviewing purposes.
Next, following Algorithm 2, we have to check which task executor among E5, E11, E16,
and E20 is ranked first by more than 50% of the task executors. From Fig. 4a it can be
seen that no task executor has been ranked by more than 50% of the task executors on the
first place. So, the task executor E20 is removed from the market. Similar procedure will
be followed on the remaining task executors as depicted in Fig. 4b. Finally, in Fig. 4c we
are left with two task executors E5 and E16 and the winner among them will be decided
based on the majority voting rule. It can be seen that, out of E5 and E16, the task executor
E16 has been ranked top by most of the task executors. So, the quality task executor
selected from the first round is E16. In the similar fashion, the quality task executors are
selected from second and third round. The task executors E8 and E19 are considered as
the quality task executors from second and third round respectively. So, the quality task
executors resulted after the quality determination phase are: E8, E16, and E19.
14January 2020
E1:
E7:
E8:
E13:
E5 E11 E16
E9:
1 3 4
2 3 1
1 2 3
3 2 1
2 1
E20
2
4
4
34
4
(a) 1st round (1st iteration)
E1:
E7:
E8:
E13:
E5 E11 E16
E9:
1 3 2
2 3 1
1 2 3
3 2 1
2 1 3
(b) 1st round (2nd iteration)
E1:
E7:
E8:
E13:
E5 E16
E9:
1 2
2 1
1 2
2 1
2 1
(c) 1st round (3rd iteration)
E5:
E11:
E16:
E20:
E1 E7 E8
E9:
2 3 1
E13
4
1 3 4 2
3 2 1 4
1 2 3 4
2 3 14
(d) 2nd round (1st iteration)
E5:
E11:
E16:
E20:
E1 E8
E9:
2 1
E13
3
1 3 2
3 1 2
1 3 2
2 13
(e) 2nd round (2nd iteration)
E5:
E11:
E16:
E20:
E1 E8
E9:
2 1
1 2
2 1
1 2
2 1
(f) 2nd round (3rd iteration)
E5:
E7:
E16:
E13:
E9 E14 E19
E1:
E22
1 3 4 2
3 2 1 4
2 3 14
2 3 1 4
1 2 3 4
(g) 3rd round (1st iteration)
E5:
E7:
E16:
E13:
E9 E19
E1:
E22
1 3 2
3 1 2
2 13
2 1 3
1 3 2
(h) 3rd round (2nd iteration)
E5:
E7:
E16:
E13:
E9 E19
E1: 1 2
2 1
2 1
2 1
1 2
(i) 3rd round (3rd iteration)
Figure 4. Detailed illustration of Algorithm 2
4.3. Allocation and Pricing Rule
In this section, the Allocation and Pricing Rule is proposed for determining who are the
winners?, and what are their payments? First, the outline of the Allocation and Pricing
Rule is presented. After that the detailed version of the Allocation and Pricing Rule is
discussed.
4.3.1. Outline of Allocation and Pricing Rule
Here, we have provided the underlying idea of the Allocation and Pricing Rule. In the
Allocation rule, first, the quality task executors are placed at suitable positions by sorting
the task executors in descending order of the ratio of the valuation of the task requester to
the square root of the demand of the task executors. Next, in each iteration the allocation
mechanism selects a task executor and a check is made whether the subset of bundle
requested by the selected task executor is not requested any of the task executors present
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in the winning set determined till now. If not, then the task executor is captured in the
winning set. The payment of the winning quality task executor i is given by the formula ,
where j is the smallest indexed task executor whose requested set of tasks is independent
of the set of tasks requested by i.
Allocation and Pricing Rule
Repeat: In each slot k :
1. Initialize: wk← φ
2. Sort the quality task executors in descending order of the ratio of the valu-
ation and the square root of the bundle requested by the task executors i.e.
υ1√
r1
≥ υ2√r2 ≥ . . .≥
υmk√rmk
.
3. For each quality task executor i: if ri∩ ⋃
j∈wk
r j = φ then wk← wk ∪{ j}.
4. For each quality task executor i ∈ wk, the payment pi = υ j ·
√ |ri|
|r j | , where j
is the smallest index such that ri∩r j 6= φ , and for all l < j, l 6= i, rl ∩r j = φ .
If no such j exists then pi = 0.
4.3.2. Detailing of Allocation and Pricing Rule
In this section, the detailing of the Allocation and Pricing Rule depicted in Alg. 3 is
presented. In line 1 of Alg. 3, the quality task executors are sorted in the descending order
of the ratio of the valuation of the task executor and the square root of the set of task
requested. Once sorted, using line 2-7, the winning set of task executors is determined.
It can be seen from line 3 that, a particular task executor will be included in the winning
set only when the set of tasks requested by the task executor under consideration is not
requested by any of the task executors present in the winning set till that point. Once the
task executor is processed, using line 6, it will be removed from the market. In line 8-18,
the payment of the winning task executors are decided. In line 9, for each task executor
E j, the smallest index k of the task executor from the sorted ordering is determined that
is not having at least a single task in common with the task executor E j and also all the
task executors present at indices prior to k are having at least a single task in common.
Now, once such k is determined, the payment of task executor E j is given by line 11. In
line 12, for each slot pi keeps track of the payment of the winning task executors. If no
such k is found, the payment of the task executor will be 0 as depicted in line 15. Line
19 returns the winning set of task executors and the payment vector for the tasks and the
task executors respectively present in the ith slot.
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Algorithm 3 Allocation and Pricing Rule
Input: ηi, υ˜ i
Output: wi← φ , pi← φ
1: Sort(ηi) . Sorting in descending order of υ1√r1 ≥
υ2√
r2
≥ . . .≥ υmk√rmk .
2: for E j ∈ ηi do
3: if r j ∩
(
∪
Ek∈wi
rk
)
= φ then
4: wi← wi∪{E j}
5: end if
6: ηi← ηi \E j
7: end for
8: for E j ∈ wi do
9: k∗ ← argmink {r`∩ rk 6= φ |∀q < k,q 6= `,rq∩ rk = φ}
10: if such k exists then
11: p j← υk∗ ·
√ |r j |
|rk∗ |
12: pi← pi∪{p j}
13: else
14: p j← 0
15: pi← pi∪{p j}
16: end if
17: end for
18: Return wi, pi
Illustrative Example For the detailed illustration of Alg. 3 we have considered the set-
up discussed in example above. In this example, we have illustrated Alg. 3 for one time
slot, say slot 1. However, similar procedure could be followed for the remaining slots. So,
in slot 1 we have 3 quality task executors E1, E5, and E9 (resulted by applying Alg. 2)
and 3 tasks as depicted in Fig. 5a. For each task executors the requested set of tasks along
with the bid value is depicted in Fig. 5a. Following the allocation rule of CAB-TAP, we
sort the task executors in descending order of the ratio of the bud value to the square root
of the requested set of tasks and we get E9 ≥ E5 ≥ E1. Utilizing line 2-7 of Alg. 2 the
task executor E9 is selected with υ9√r9 =
18√
2
= 12.729 and placed in the winning set w1.
E1 :
E5 :
E9 :
β1 = 〈{t1}, 10〉
β5 = 〈{t1, t7}, 13〉
β9 = 〈{t5, t7}, 18〉
(a) Initial Set-up
E1
E9
⇐ {t1}
⇐ {t5, t7}
E5 ⇐ {}
p1 = 0
p5 = 0
p9 = 14.14
(b) Allocation and Price Determination
Figure 5. Detailed Illustration of Algorithm 3
Next in the order task executor E1 is selected with υ1√r1 =
10√
1
= 10 and placed in the
winning set w1. Finally the task executor E5 is considered but is not placed into the
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winning set w1 as there exists a conflict in the requested set of tasks by both E1 and
E9. So, the task executor E5 is not placed in the winning set w1. The final winning set
is: w1 = {E1,E9}. For the task executor E9, we have got the index 2 that satisfies the
condition in line 9 of Alg. 3. So, the payment for the task executor E9 will be given as
p9 = 10 ·
√
2
1 = 10× 1.414 = 14.14. For the task executor E1 the payment is zero i.e.
p1 = 0 as there exists no such index.
5. Analysis of CAB-TAP
In this section, first we have shown that the running time of CAB-TAP is bounded above
by O(n2). Next, we will prove that CAB-TAP is truthful. The CAB-TAP is using the
framework of greedy mechanism [4]. The greedy mechanism is truthful. So, first we have
provided the proposition regarding the truthfulness of greedy mechanism and then we
have proved that CAB-TAP is truthful (see Theorem 5.3). In Lemma 5.7 it has been
shown that the expected number of task executors getting their requested set (or superset)
of tasks is given by nτ · p, nτ is the number of task executors present in the slot τ and p is
the probability that a particular task executor is getting his preferred set (or superset) of
tasks. This lemma will provide us an estimate on the number of task executors allocated
their requested set of tasks in a non-conflicting manner. Further, in Lemma 5.8 we have
shown that the probability that at least 3nτ4 of the task executors are getting their requested
set (or superset) of tasks is less than or equal to 23 .
Theorem 5.1. The running time of CAB-TAP is given as O(n2).
Proof. The running time of CAB-TAP will be the sum of the following components: Slot
allocation, Quality determination, and Allocation and pricing rule. For the analysis pur-
pose, say, the number of slots allocated by τ . So, the for loop in line 1-6 will execute for
τ+1 times, as there are τ slots. Line 2 takes time equal to the time taken by Algorithm
2. For the time being let the time taken by Algorithm 2 be O(Y ). Similarly, line 3 takes
time equal to the time taken by Algorithm 3. Let us say the time taken by Algorithm 3
be O(Z). Line 4 and 5 will take O(1) time. So, the running time of Algorithm 1 will be
O(τ)+O(Y )+O(Z).
In Algorithm 2, the initializations in line 1 will take O(1) time. Line 4-18 of Al-
gorithm 2 iterates for niu times. As in line 4 of the Algorithm 2 a copy of the list of
task executors present in slot i is maintained and will take time equal to the length of Ei
and is given as ni. So, line 4 is bounded above by O(ni). In line 5, u task executors are
picked up randomly and picking that many task executors will take O(u) time, as each
random pick will take constant time. In line 6 of the Algorithm 2 a copy of the list of
task executors picked up randomly in line 5 is maintained and will take time equal to the
number of IoT devices picked up and is given as u times. So, line 6 is bounded above
by O(u). In line 7, v task executors are picked up randomly and picking that many task
executors will take O(v) time, as each random pick will take constant time. Assigning u
IoT devices to any of the v IoT devices among (ni−u) IoT devices will take O(u) time
and as we have to assign to v IoT devices for ranking purpose so, line 8 will take O(uv)
time. Further, line 10-16 in the worst case will execute for u−1 times, so it is bounded
above by O(u). In line 18 the removal of IoT devices that are already ranked are taking
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place and it will take O(uni) time. For each iteration of the while loop line 3-19 will take
O(u)+O(v)+O(uv)+O(u2)+O(uni) = O(uni). So, Algorithm 2 is bounded above by
O(( niu )uni) = O(ni
2).
In Algorithm 3 sorting in line 1 will take O(ni lgni) time. The for loop in line 2-7
will execute for ni+1 times, as we have ni quality task executors in the worst case. The
condition in line 3 will take O(ni) time. Line 4 will take O(1) time. In line 6, the task
executor E j is removed from the list and will take O(ni) time. So, the for loop in line 2-7
is bounded above by O(n2i ). If we have say ni task executors in w
i, then 8-17 will execute
for O(ni) times. In each iteration of for loop, line 9 will take O(ni) time. Line 10-16 is
bounded above by O(1). So, the for loop in line 8-17 is bounded above by O(n2i ). The
running time of Alg. 3 is O(n2i ).
The overall running time of CAB-TAP is O(τuni) +O(τn2i ) = O(τn2i ). It will be
O(n2) if each of the time slot having nk task executors.
Proposition 5.2. The greedy mechanism for single-minded bidders is truthful [4].
Theorem 5.3. The CAB-TAP mechanism is truthful.
Proof. In the line similar to [4], the proof in our setting is presented. Fix a slot j. For any
task executor i, the type information can be mis-reported in three different ways:
• Misreporting only the requested set of tasks for execution i.e βˆ i = 〈rˆi,υi〉, such
that rˆi 6= ri,
• Misreporting only the valuation i.e. βˆ i = 〈ri,bi〉, such that bi 6= υi, and
• Misreporting both requested set of tasks and the valuation i.e. βˆ i = 〈rˆi,bi〉, such
that rˆi 6= ri and bi 6= υi.
So, this gives rise to three different cases:
Case 1. [βˆ i 6= β i as rˆi 6= ri ] : Given this condition, the two cases can happen. If rˆi ⊂
ri, then in that case the task executor Ei loses and his utility will be 0 i.e. ui = 0. The
reason is, as rˆi does not contain the true requested set of tasks of Ei. On the other hand,
considering the second case, if rˆi ⊇ ri, then the two scenarios can happen. If Ei was
losing with β i = 〈ri,υi〉 then he continues to lose with βˆ i = 〈rˆi,υi〉 because the task
executor Ei will be appearing later in the ordering. However, if he was winning with type
β i = 〈ri,υi〉, then by reporting the type as βˆ i = 〈rˆi,υi〉 the two things can happen. He
may lose in that case his utility will be zero i.e. ui = 0. Another case may be, he may win.
If he wins, then in that case the payment made to the task executor Ei will be more or
will be equal to the payment made when reporting truthfully.
Case 2. [βˆ i 6= β i as bi 6= υi ] : Under this condition, we can observe that the two scenar-
ios can happen. If the ith task executor was winning with β i = 〈ri,bi〉 then he may con-
tinue to win with βˆ i = 〈ri,bi〉 such that bi > υi. As in that scenario, the task executor Ei
will be appearing earlier in the ordering and will result in same or less payment. So, the
utility u′i = ui > 0. But, if the task executor Ei is reporting βˆ i = 〈ri,bi〉 such that bi < υi,
then in this case the task executor may lose and will have zero utility. Considering the
second scenario, if the ith task executor is losing with β i = 〈ri,υi〉 then by reporting
βˆ i = 〈ri,bi〉 such that bi > υi such that the two scenario may occur. One scenario may be,
the task executor Ei will continue to lose and the utility will be zero i.e. ui = 0. In other
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scenario by reporting βˆ i = 〈ri,bi〉 such that bi > υi may win. In such case the payment
pi < υi and hence the utility is negative.
Case 3. [βˆ i 6= β i as bi 6= υi and rˆi 6= ri ] : It follows from Case 1 that any task executor
Ei cannot maximize his utility by misreporting his requested set of tasks i.e. ri. Consid-
ering Case 2, it can be concluded that any task executor Ei cannot gain by misreporting
his valuation υi. So, combining Case 1 and Case 2, it can be concluded that any task
executor Ei cannot gain by misreporting the set of requested tasks and the valuation.
This concludes the proof.
Proposition 5.4. The greedy mechanism for single-minded bidders in [4,22] has an ap-
proximation ratio of
√
nτ , where nτ is the number of tasks in any slot τ .
Observation 1. As stated earlier, the proposed mechanism for our case i.e. CAB-TAP
consists of three components, out of which Slot Allocation Mechanism and Quality de-
termination mechanism are independent of bid value and the requested set of tasks by
the task executors.
Corollary 5.5. From Observation 1, it can be seen that Slot Allocation Mechanism and
Quality determination mechanism are independent of bid value and the requested set of
tasks by the task executors.
Proof. The approximation ratio is measured in terms of the ratio of the number of task
executors getting their requested set (or superset) of the tasks in a non-conflicting manner
by the optimal algorithm to the number of task executors getting their requested set (or
superset) of the tasks in a non-conflicting manner by the CAB-TAP. However, the final
allocation done to the task executors is done by the Allocation and payment. This final
allocation of the CAB-TAP will be compared with the allocation done by the optimal
algorithm that could be thought of considering the bid values and the requested set of
tasks of the task executors. Hence, we can conclude that the approximation ratio is not
being affected by Slot allocation mechanism and Quality determination mechanism.
Corollary 5.6. In any slot nτ , the social welfare obtained from CAB-TAP is at most
√
nτ
away from the social welfare obtained from any optimal algorithm.
Proof. The Allocation and pricing rule of CAB-TAP is used to determine the winning
task executors (the task executors getting their requested set of tasks) and the payment
made to each of the selected task executors. The allocation and payment characterization
of of the CAB-TAP is based on the allocation and payment rule discussed in [4,22]. So,
by Proposition 5.4, we can infer that, the social welfare obtained from CAB-TAP is at
most
√
nτ away from the social welfare obtained from any optimal algorithm.
Lemma 5.7. In any slot τ , the expected number of task executors getting their requested
set (or superset) of tasks is given by nτ · p, where p is the probability that a particular task
executor is getting his preferred set (or superset) of tasks. More formally, E[Z] = nτ · p,
where Z is the random variable that is capturing the total number of task executors
getting their requested set (or superset) of tasks.
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Proof. Fix the task executor Ei. Here, our aim is to determine the expected number of
task executors getting their requested set (or superset) of tasks. The indicator random
variable Z is used to determine the total number of task executors getting their requested
set (or superset) of tasks. So, the expected number of task executors getting their re-
quested set (or superset) of tasks is given as E[Z]. Now, the sample space associated with
the task executor Ei is given by S = {Ei gets the requested set (or superset) of tasks, Ei
do not gets the requested set (or superset) of tasks}. Now, let the probability that Ei gets
the requested set (or superset) of tasks be p i.e. Pr{Ei gets the requested set (or superset)
of tasks} = p and the probability that Ei do not get the requested set (or superset) of tasks
be 1− p i.e. Pr{Ei do not get the requested set (or superset) of tasks} = 1− p. We can
define the indicator random variable Zi, associated with the task executor Ei getting the
requested set (or superset) of tasks, which is event G. We write
Zi = I{G}
Zi =
{
1, if G happens
0, Otherwise
The expected value of the task executor Ei getting the requested set (or superset) of tasks
is simply the expected value of our indicator random variable Zi:
E[Zi] = E[I{G}]
= 1 · Pr{G} + 0 · Pr{G¯}
= 1 · p + 0 · (1− p)
= p
Thus, the expected value of the task executor Ei getting the requested set (or superset)
of tasks is p. Now let us consider the random variable that we are interested in and is
given by Z=
nτ
∑
i=1
Zi. We can compute the expected number of task executors getting their
requested set (or superset) of tasks by taking expectation both side. So, we get
E[Z] = E
[
nτ
∑
i=1
Zi
]
By linearity of expectation, we can write
E[Z] =
nτ
∑
i=1
E[Zi]
=
nτ
∑
i=1
p
= nτ · p
From above it can be seen that, if the value of p = 12 then the value of E[Z] is boiling
down to nτ2 . It means that half of the task executors out of the available ones are getting
their requested set (or superset) of tasks.
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Observation 2. If the value of p = 12 and nτ = 100 then E[Zi] = nτ · p = 100 · 12 = 50. It
means that in expectation half of the task executors are getting either their requested set
of tasks or the superset of the tasks.
Lemma 5.8. In any slot τ , the probability that the number of task executors getting their
requested set (or superset) of tasks is atleast 3nτ4 is less than or equal to
2
3 . In other
words, we have
Pr
{
Z≥ 3nτ
4
}
≤ 2
3
Proof. Let Z be the indicator random variable capturing the event that the total number
of task executors getting their requested set (or superset) of tasks and is given as Z = {
number of task executors getting their requested set (or superset) of tasks}. We can write
I =
{
1, if Z ≥ 3nτ4
0, Otherwise
(2)
From equation 2, we can write
Z ≥ 3nτ4 =⇒ 1≤ Z3nτ
4
i.e.
I ≤ Z3nτ
4
Taking expectation both side, we get
E[I]≤ E
[
Z
3nτ
4
]
= 13nτ
4
·E[Z]
E[I]≤ 4
3nτ
·E[Z] (3)
From the definition of the expected value of the random variable, the left hand side of
the equation 3 can be written as:
Pr
{
Z≥ 3nτ
4
}
·1≤ 4
3nτ
·E[Z] (4)
From Lemma 5.7 substituting the value of E[Z] as nτ2 in equation 4, we get
Pr
{
Z≥ 3nτ
4
}
·1≤ 4
3nτ
· nτ
2
(5)
Equation 5 above can be written as:
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Pr
{
Z≥ 3nτ
4
}
≤ 2
3
Observation 3. From Lemma 5.8, it can be observed that, if n j = 100 then with prob-
ability at most 0.67 more than 75 task executors will be getting their requested set (or
superset) of tasks.
Lemma 5.9. In any slot τ , the expected number of times a task executor Ei will partic-
ipate in the ranking process (i.e. for providing the rank to the work of peers) is given
as d nτyi e · p. Here, nτ is the number of task executors available in the slot τ and yi is the
number of distinct task executors that will be ranked each time. More formally, we can
say E[Xi] = d nτyi e · p, where Xi is the indicator random variable capturing the number of
times a task executor Ei is picked up for the ranking purpose.
Proof. Fix a slot τ . Here, we are trying to determine that how many times in expectation
any task executor Ei will participate in ranking process. Let Xi be the indicator random
variable capturing the number of times a task executor Ei is picked up for the ranking
purpose. As there are nτ number of task executors and each time yi number of task ex-
ecutors are to be ranked. So, the number of iterations for which the ranking process will
be carried out is given as d nτyi e i.e. 1,2, . . . ,d
nτ
yi
e iterations. Now, let us determine the
probability that the task executor Ei will be picked up for providing the rank in any jth
iteration. The sample space will be S = {Ei is providing rank in jth iteration, Ei is not
providing rank in jth iteration}. So, Pr{Ei is providing rank in jth iteration} = p and
the Pr{Ei is not providing rank in jth iteration} = (1− p). We can define the indicator
random variable Xi j, associated with Ei is providing rank in jth iteration, which is event
U. This variable counts the number of times Ei is providing rank in this iteration, and it
is 1 if Ei is providing rank in jth iteration and 0 otherwise. We write
Xi j = I{U}
Xi j =
{
1, if U occurs,
0,otherwise.
(6)
The expected number of times a task executor Ei will participate in the ranking process is
simply the expected value of our indicator variable Xi j, so taking expectation both side,
we get:
E[Xi j] = E[I{U}]
= 1 · Pr{U} + 0 · Pr{U¯}
Here, U¯= S−U
= 1 · p + 0 · (1− p)
= p
January 2020 23
Let Xi be the random variable denoting the number of times a task executor Ei will
participate in the ranking process out of
⌈
nτ
yi
⌉
iteration, and is given as:
Xi =
d nτyi e
∑
j=1
Xi j (7)
Taking expectation both side of equation 7, we get
E[Xi] = E
[ d nτyi e
∑
j=1
Xi j
]
(8)
By linearity of expectation, we get
E[Xi] =
d nτyi e
∑
j=1
E[Xi j]
=
d nτyi e
∑
j=1
p
=
⌈
nτ
yi
⌉
· p
For p = 12 , we can have
E[Xi] =
1
2
⌈nτ
yi
⌉
If p= 12 , then in that case E[Xi] =
1
2 · d nτyi e we can see that in expectation half of the times
of number of iterations the task executor Ei is participating in the ranking process.
Observation 4. If we have p = 23 , nτ = 100, and yi = 5, then the expected number of
times the task executor Ei is considered for the ranking purpose is given as:
E[Xi] =
⌈
nτ
yi
⌉
∑
j=1
p
=
⌈
100
5
⌉
∑
j=1
2
3
=
20
∑
j=1
2
3
=
2
3
×20
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w 13.34
w 14
From Lemma 5.9 and Observation 4, we can infer that fixing the value of nτ and yi, if
the p value is very low, then the expected number of times a task executor Ei will be
considered is quite low.
Corollary 5.10. In any slot τ , the probability that the number of times any ith task ex-
ecutor may be considered for the ranking process (i.e. providing the rank to the works of
peers) is greater than dln10e is bounded above by 0.744. More formally, we can write
Pr
{
Xi > dln10e
}
<
(
e
dln10e
)dln10e
= 0.744
To get this result, we will make use of the following version of Chernoff’s bound:
Proposition 5.11 (Chernoff’s bound [36]). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be mutually independent
random variables with common range [0,1] and X =
n
∑
i=1
Xi. Given this, for every δ > 0,
we have:
Pr{X > (1+δ )E[X ]}<
(
e(1+δ )
(1+δ )(1+δ )
)E[X ]
(9)
In order to see the proof, we recommend readers to go through [6].
Proof of Corollary 5.10. Fix a slot τ and an arbitrary task executor Ei. Let us say δ =
dln10e−1, and E[Xi] = 1. From equation 9 we get,
Pr
{
Xi > dln10e
}
<
(
e(1+(dln10e−1))
(1+(dln10e−1))(1+(dln10e−1))
)1
=
(
e
(1+(dln10e−1))
)(1+(dln10e−1))
=
(
e
dln10e
)dln10e
=
(
2.718
d2.303e
)d2.303e
=
(
2.718
3
)3
= 0.744
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Here, we can say that with the probability at most 0.744 the task executor Ei will
be considered for more than 3 times for the ranking. If we consider the case Pr{Xi > 4}
then we have Pr{Xi > 4}< 0.21. So, we can infer that with the probability at most 0.21
the task executor Ei will be considered for more than 4 times for the ranking.
Lemma 5.12. In any slot τ , the probability that any task executor Ei is considered for at
least one time out of d nτyi e is greater than or equal to 1−
(
1
e
) 1
2 d nτyi e
. More formally, we
can write
Pr
{
Xi ≥ 1
}
≥ 1−
(
1
e
) 1
2 d nτyi e
(10)
where, the number of times the task executor Ei is considered for the ranking is taken
care by random variable Xi.
Proof. Fix a slot τ and the task executor Ei. Following Lemma 5.9, the ranking process
takes place for d nτyi e iterations. The probability that Ei is providing rank in jth iteration
is p (i.e. Pr{Ei is providing rank in jth iteration} = p) and probability that Ei is not
providing rank in jth iteration is (1− p) (i.e. Pr{Ei is not providing rank in jth iteration} =
(1− p)). The task executor Ei will be considered for the ranking purpose in any iteration
is independent of his consideration in the remaining iterations. The probability that Ei
will not be picked up for the ranking purpose in any of the d nτyi e iterations is given as:
Pr
{
Xi < 1
}
= (1− p) · (1− p) · . . .
⌈
nτ
yi
⌉
times
= (1− p)d
nτ
yi
e (11)
Using the inequality 1+ y≤ ey, the equation 11 can be rewritten as:
Pr
{
Xi < 1
}
≤ e−pd
nτ
yi
e
=
(
1
e
)pd nτyi e
The probability that Ei will be picked up for the ranking purpose in at least one iteration
out of d nτyi e iterations is given as:
Pr
{
Xi ≥ 1
}
≥ 1−
(
1
e
)pd nτyi e
(12)
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Putting the value of p as 12 in equation 12, we get
Pr
{
Xi ≥ 1
}
≥ 1−
(
1
e
) 1
2 d nτyi e
(13)
6. Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, first we have discussed the recent development done in the direction of
IoT-based crowdsourcing in strategic setting. After the brief overview of the work carried
out in the past in IoT-based crowdsourcing, we elaborate the problem scenario that is
investigated in IoT-based crowdsourcing, in this chapter. We have designed a quality
adaptive truthful mechanism for allocating the subset of IoT devices to the tasks in a
non-conflicting manner with the constraint of maximizing the social welfare.
In our future work we shall study issues of efficiency of the proposed mechanisms
under the dynamics and scalability of the task set and IoT devices pool. Additionally,
matching of task requirements with IoT device profiles will be considered as an interest-
ing feature of task management crowdsourcing platform.
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Acronyms
TUBE-TAP –Truthful bUdget feasiBle mEchanism for Task Allocation Problem
CAB-TAP –Combinatorial Auction Based mechanism for Task Assignment Problem
IC –Incentive Compatible
IoT –Internet of Things
Glossary
Crowdsourcing: It could be thought of as an open call to the community for accom-
plishing one or more tasks.
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Private information: The information that is only known to the task executor under
consideration and not known to others.
IoT: It is a system of interrelated computing devices, object, animals, or people that
are provided with unique identifiers (UIDs) and the ability to transfer data over a
network without requiring human-to-human or human-to-computer interaction.
Task executor: Agent that execute the provided tasks.
Task requester: Agent carrying task(s) to be done.
Platform: It collects the task(s) from the task requesters and project it to the outside
world where several task executors are present for executing the task(s).
Mechanisms: It is also known as Algorithms.
Rational: Rationality of a task executor means that the task executor chooses the actions
so as to maximize a well-defined utility.
Non-conflict: No two task executors will be having a common task in their requested
set of tasks.
Valuation: It is the maximum value the task executor can charge in exchange of his
service.
Utility: It is simply the quasi linear utility, means the difference between the true valu-
ation and the payment.
Peer grading: It is an activity in which the task executors judge the tasks completed by
their peers.
Index of Terms
Allocation, 5
Bid value, 9
Combinatorial auction, 4
Crowd workers, 1
Crowdsourcing, 1
Incentive, 2
Incentive Compatible, 26
IoT devices, 4
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Peer grading, 5
Platform, 26
Pricing rule, 10
Quality task executors selection, 10
Single-minded bidders, 9
Slot allocation, 5
Social welfare, 9
Strategic, 1
Task executor, 3
Task requester, 3
Truthful, 4
Utility, 9
Valuation, 27
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